A Control-Plane Perspective on Reducing Data Access Latency in LTE Networks

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ABSTRACT
Control-plane operations are indispensable to providing data access to mobile devices in the 4G LTE networks. They provision necessary control states at the device and network nodes to enable data access. However, the current design may suffer from long data access latency even under good radio conditions. The fundamental problem is that, data-plane packet delivery cannot start or resume until all control-plane procedures are completed, and these control procedures run sequentially by design. We show both are more than necessary under popular use cases. We design DPCM, which reduces data access latency through parallel processing approaches and exploiting device-side state replica. We implement DPCM and validate its effectiveness with extensive evaluations.

KEYWORDS
4G/5G network, control plane, latency, parallel processing, device-side state replica

1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile users want always-on, low-latency network services. When accessing the Internet, we want data services available immediately. When we move, we expect negligible service suspension in mobility. This demand will be more pressing with the emerging delay-sensitive services, such as real-time virtual reality, safe autonomous driving, remote healthcare monitoring, etc.

In achieving this, the control plane operations play a vital role on providing users data access in the state-of-art mobile network (4G LTE). To establish data access to the Internet, the control plane must first create a service session (aka. connectivity) for each device. This session will install states at the device and all involved network nodes (base station, gateway, and mobility controller). When the device moves, it should retain the data access by migrating the ongoing session states to the user’s new location. Upon transient failures (radio link outage, or rejected requests during control procedure), the session needs to be recovered or recreated. In all cases, these control procedures are well justified, since they provision necessary states to enable mobile data access. In fact, they need to be successfully completed before starting/resuming the data-plane packet delivery. This leads to user-perceived data access latency.

Unfortunately, we find that the current LTE control-plane operations are slow. Our 19-month user study over four major US carriers shows that, such control functions result in frequent impact on latency. For each device, the session establishment happens every 106.9s on average. The control functions contributes 72.5–999.6 ms latency to every session establishment, resulting in aggregated negative impacts. Such control functions result in the average latency of 168.7ms, 901.6ms and 0.8–3.0s (up to 1.1s, 1.9s, 11.0s) in every service establishment, wide-area roaming via location update and service access upon various failures ($\S$2).

The fundamental reason is that, these procedures are mandated to run in globally sequential order. While intuitive and straightforward, this is inefficient for three reasons: (1) Some control procedures are not mandatory to starting/resuming data service, but they have to be completed first; (2) Some control procedures could run in parallel, but they are mandated to run sequentially; and (3) In presence of failures, the entire control sequence would be blocked, thus prolonging the latency. While discovered 4G LTE, such sequential execution design is a common practice, and still continues in various ongoing 5G standardization proposals [18].

We propose DPCM, a paradigm that reduces data access latency by accelerating the control-plane operations. The key observation is that, data-plane forwarding can start without waiting for all the control procedures to be completed. DPCM treats the control procedures as a state management problem, and accelerates the data access with three techniques. It first bypasses certain sequence of control procedures, and substitute them with equivalent, faster operations. To this end, we leverage the state replicas that are already available at the device, retrieve them early and install them at the nodes of interest. Second, we pipeline certain control-plane signaling procedures with the data-plane packet delivery. Last, DPCM parallelizes control procedures that are mandatory to retaining data service. We implement DPCM as a modular extension of OpenAirInterface [4], a software-defined cellular protocol stack. Our evaluation shows that, for every session establishment, wide-area roaming and various failure handling, on average DPCM achieves 88.7ms (2.1x), 735.4ms (5.8x) and 580.8ms–2.6s (7.8x–11.5x) latency reduction, respectively. On average, it reduces the video loading time from 9.8s to 5.7s (1.7x), and web loading from 1.5s to 0.7s (2.1x).

2 MEASURING LATENCY
We motivate our work with an experimental study of user-perceived data latency in operational 4G networks. Our latency study covers...
three main use cases: establishing data access (C1), retaining data access upon handover (C2) and wide-area roaming (C3).

Background: 4G LTE network. Figure 1 depicts a simplified LTE network architecture, consisting of four types of nodes: the base station (BS), the gateways (GWs), the mobility controller (MC), and the user profile server. Similar to the Internet, the LTE performs both control and data plane operations. On the data plane, IP packets are delivered between the device and the Internet or between devices. The BS offers radio access to the device, while the gateways deliver data packets over the core infrastructure. On the control plane, various functions are provided to facilitate data delivery, including radio resource allocation, session management, mobility support, billing, and security, etc.

To support user mobility, the 4G network infrastructure is divided into multiple location domains. Each domain has multiple BSes and gateways, and is managed by an MC. Retaining data service in mobility has two cases: (1) handover within a domain, and (2) wide-area roaming (via location update) across domains.

Methodology and Dataset. We invited 15 volunteers (students, faculty members and company employees) using 23 phones, to sporadically participate in the user study during the 19-month period from 07/31/2015 to 02/28/2017. This study uses seven Android models (Google Pixel, Huawei Nexus 6P, Motorola Nexus 6, Samsung Galaxy S4/S5, LG Optimus 2, and LG Tribute) and two iPhone models (iPhone 5 and iPhone 6s Plus), over all four major US carriers.

We measure latency by analyzing control-plane messages collected by Mobielnsight [3, 38], an open-source tool that enables the collection of fine-grained 4G protocol messages inside the phones. To identify the latency of each control procedure, we correlate each with our traces by following LTE standards [8, 11, 14]. We extract data access establishment and mobility records (each as a sequence of cellular messages, see Figure 4). For each record, we locate the messages to indicate the start/end events to retrieve latency (response/suspension/interruption time). As data services are initiated or resumed until these control functions finish, latency perceived by users is no shorter than the duration signified by the signaling messages. We thus measure the lower bound. We further preserve user privacy by not collecting user/phone identities or other phone logs. Our dataset includes 1,222,673 4G signaling messages, from which 95,057 session establishments/migrations are extracted (Table 1).

Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 2 show the latency in all three cases without/with transient failures. The results are consistent across network carriers with different phone models.

C1: Latency in establishing new data service. We calculate the time elapsed from issuing the data service request to accessing the data service. Our result shows that, it takes 168.7 ms on average, ranging from 72.5 ms to 999.6 ms. Note that this latency is observed by every data session whenever a user starts. It is frequently experienced by users in reality. In the user study of 81,285 session establishments, a new data access is seen every 106.9 seconds. In the presence of transient radio outage (2.8% probability among all the requests), the latency is prolonged by 591.9–1165.0 ms in each establishment (C1F). The average delay increases to 846.9 ms (5.0×).

C2: Latency in retaining data service in handover. With an ongoing data, when the user moves to a different BS in the same location domain, the radio signal to the old base station turns weak, and handover is triggered. Our user study shows that, handover occurs every 70.0 s on average in walking scenarios. Normally, handover provides seamless mobility support, and small suspension is observed (24.7 ms on average). However, transient radio outage may occur during handovers. We have observed 1.1% (106 out of 9,771) such failure instances. In such cases, transient outage incurs 670.1 ms delay on average, ranging between [252.5 ms, 1.9 s].
We next analyze where the above latency stems from. We show bearer modification in P8. After that, downlink data forwarding gateway to notify the device. Specifically, the gateway notifies MC P8 need to be completed before data delivery starts. They help the multiple rounds of message exchanges.

Radio bearer with the device in P5. Note that P1, P3, and P5 involve MC sends the context setup request to BS in P4, and BS establishes authentication and security functions with the profile server in P3, BS in P1, BS then sends a service request to MC in P2, MC performs procedures P1–P5 have to be completed during P1–P5 have to be completed in LTE: (S1) radio access list (RACL), which regulates radio access control between the device and BS; (S2) user’s security context, including symmetric keys; (S3) user’s billing policy; (S4) QoS policy on the user’s service; (S5) user’s location (represented as IDs of serving BS and GW on the route); and (S6) the device’s IP address. Besides, LTE also defines other local/internal states (e.g. temporary identifiers). We have validated that they are either dynamically generated based on above states, or not mandatory for data forwarding.

For data delivery, the prerequisite on states is as follows. For uplink data, the device must have states S1–S6 [8, 14], the BS must have states S1–S5 [14, 15] and the gateway must have states S3 and S4 [7, 11]. Each state should keep the same value at different nodes. For downlink data, the gateway further needs S5.

Given these states, four basic state operations can be abstracted: Create, Delete, Update, Copy. The first three define the actions at a single node, and the last one defines the state transfer from one node to another. For instance, CopyX → Y[S] represents a copy action on state S from node X to node Y. OP[S] denotes one of the three single-node operations on state S at X. In LTE, these operations are realized with the control procedures in Figure 4 (standardized in [7, 8, 14, 15]). The functionalities after these operations are the same as the standardized ones in LTE.

The control-plane procedures in LTE can be viewed accordingly. Table 3 lists all state operations in each control procedure used in C1–C3 based on 3GPP standards. Note that, MC generally plays a central role, since it usually keeps the primary copy of the states. Initially, upon powering on or disabling the airplane mode, each device performs the attach procedure. This is to register the device and bootstrap the access. When this procedure completes, MC has a complete copy of all states S1–S6, and propagates them to the BS and the device. These states stored at the device and the MC remain unchanged, unless being explicitly deleted when the device detaches from the network. Among them, only S2 can be regularly updated whenever the procedure P3 is invoked. The gateway always keeps S3 and S4, until the device changes its gateway (e.g., due to roaming to another location domain). The BS may delete the states for an associated device if the device stays inactive (say, after 10 ± 0.5s).

For uplink service establishment in C1, the state operations are as follows. S5 (BS ID here) is stored at BS but copied from BS to MC in P2; P3 updates S2 at MC, the user profile server and the device (a new key pair is created to replace the old one). In P4, S1–S4 are copied from MC to BS and S3–S4 are copied from MC to BS, where S1, S3 and S4 are stored at MC since the attach procedure. Afterwards, BS has all needed states (S1–S5) and GW has states.
Figure 4: Control-plane procedures and data-plane forwarding for three cases (C1, C2, C3).

Table 3: LTE control procedures and their state operations in C1–C3 (UE: device, s: profile server).

Procedure [Standard] | LTE-stack messages | States | State operations
--- | --- | --- | ---
P1: Radio conn. setup[14] | RRC connection setup | S5 | copyUE→BS
P2: Service request[8] | NAS service request | S5 | copyBS→MC
P3: Auth. and security[6, 19] | RRC security command | S2 | updateUE, updateMC
P4: Initial context setup[13] | STAP initial context setup | S1, S2, S3, S4 | copyMC→BS
P5: Data bearer setup[14] | RRC connection reconfiguration | - | -
P6: Data notification[7, 11] | Downlink data notification | - | -
P7: Paging messages[5] | Paging message | - | -
P8: Modify bearer[5] | Modify bearer request | S5 | copyMC→GW
P9: Radio conn. re-establishment[14] | RRC connection re-establishment | - | -
P10: Location update[8] | Tracking area update request | S5 | copyUE→MC2
P11: Primary state transfer[7, 11] | Context request/response | S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 | copyMC1→MC2 [S1, S2, S3, S4, S6], copyMC2→MC1 [S5], deleteMC1 [S1, S2, S3, S4, S6]
P12: Bearer update[7, 11] | Create session/Modify bearer request | S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 | copyMC2→BS2 [S1, S2, S3, S4, S5], copyMC2→GW2 [S3, S4, S5], copyMC1→GW1 [S5]
P13: User location profile update[12] | Update/Cancel location request | S5 | copyMC2→MC2, deleteMC2
P4: Attach | Bootstrap phase | S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6 | not shown here

(S3, S4, S5, S6), thus ready for data delivery. For downlink access in C1, S5 is copied from MC to the gateways in P8 to meet the additional requirements for downlink data delivery. Note that, the device already has a local copy of S1–S6 before the service establishment; only S2 is updated in P3.

**Insights.** We make two observations:

(1) **Control-plane procedures are done sequentially, mostly through MC.** They block data service until completion. Data-plane forwarding cannot start until all control procedures are over. The LTE standards mandate sequential operations on control-plane procedures. They are to ensure correctness of state operations. Most such procedures are done through MC, which holds the primary copy of states.

(2) **Not all the sequential operations are necessary.** For example, P2 is not mandatory to start uplink data, because data can be forwarded regardless of whether the location state S5 is updated at MC or not.

**Guidelines.** The above implies two guidelines to reduce latency:

(1) **The existing state replica at the device can be leveraged to accelerate some control procedures.** Once attached, the device retains a copy of all S1–S6. We can leverage such state replica to bypass certain operations among LTE nodes. For example, without copying states from MC, BS copies states from the device-side replica directly in P1, thus bypassing P4.

(2) **State operations can be accelerated through piggybacked signaling exchanges.** We can copy the needed states, and piggyback them in the existing signaling messages exchanged among nodes. For example, we may piggyback the device-side replica in the message from the device to BS in P1.

### 3.2 Handover (C2)

Handover is a common control-plane procedure triggered by user mobility. It is initiated by the network, if the device is at active state (when it remains active in data transfer). It retains the established data service. Ideally a successful handover should incur negligible latency on data-plane forwarding. Data delivery continues with the
old BS when the network initiates handover. Data forwarding proceeds with the new BS after the handover. Interestingly, handover is initiated by the device if at the idle mode.

We examine latency in handover upon state operation failures (C2F). Figure 4b plots an example incurred by transient radio outage. Assume the planned handover for the device is to BS1. However, if the signal suddenly turns weak, this handover to the new BS1 will not succeed. Due to this handover failure and its lost connectivity with the old BS, upon handover, the device selects another new BS2 (with strong radio signal) for handover. Radio connectivity to BS2 then needs to be reestablished for data access in P9. However, such a re-connection request would be rejected, because the device has never established radio connectivity with BS2 a priori. It thus incurs a control-plane operation failure. To cope with such a failure, the device has to run the entire sequence of service establishment procedures (C1) from P1 to P5, and the data service will be suspended in between. Moreover, our user study shows that, this type of transient radio link outage is regularly observed in operational LTE networks.

State management perspective. The long delay is actually caused by running the needed state operations sequentially. When the newly selected BS2 receives the RRC data service request in P9, it needs to have necessary states (S1–S5) to provide services. Without such states, BS2 has to reject the request and report a failure. However, copying states (S1–S5) from BS1 to BS2 is not supported by the current LTE standards. Copying from the old BS is neither an option, since it may have deleted all states after the planned handover to BS1. So BS2 has to let the device initiate the service establishment process (C1), to copy those states from MC. It can only start to offer data access after completing all operations.

Insight. We make another observation:

(I3) Lengthy control-plane operations can be triggered by transient radio link outage, thus incurring prolonged latency. The link outage during handover invokes the connectivity re-establishment request from the device (P9), which is rejected by BS2. The rejection further incurs lengthy operations P1–P5 and extra latency.

Guideline. We come up with another design rule:

(G3) State replica can help to avoid state operation failures. The available state replica at the device may help to eliminate control operation failures. In this case, the connection re-establishment fails since BS2 cannot copy the connectivity state from BS1. Instead, the newly selected BS2 can obtain the correct state replica from the device via the connection re-establishment request. This way, BS2 offers service immediately.

3.3 Wide-Area Roaming (C3)

In C3, location update is invoked when the user moves to a new location domain. In this case, a sequence of control-plane procedures are executed to resume its data service in the new domain, as shown in Figure 4c. Upon radio connectivity setup in P1, the device reports its arrival to the new MC (i.e., MC2) in P10. The new MC migrates states from the old MC, and notifies the device’s location to the new MC in P11. Authentication and security procedure (P3) is applied again to the device. To resume data service, a data bearer (spanning the new BS/gateways, and old gateways) is sequentially updated in P12: The new MC initializes the bearer context at the new BS (P12-1), and modifies the new gateway’s bearer (P12-2). Afterwards, the old MC also reconfigures the old gateway (P12-3), which then can relay its buffered downlink data to the device (via tunneling). The user’s latest location is recorded at the profile server and deleted at the old MC in P13. The new MC updates the profile server (P13-1), which then notifies the old MC to delete the device’s location (P13-2/3) and acknowledges to the new MC (P13-4).

State management perspective. To resume data delivery, the new BS must have states (S1–S5) identical to the device’s ones, and the new gateway should know S3 and S4 (and S5 for downlink access). Moreover, the old gateway should also know the latest S5 so that it can relay the buffered downlink data to the device. In P11, all states except location (S5) are deleted at the old MC after being copied to the new MC, and the new MC copies S5 to the old MC. This leads to state migration between two MCs. In P12, states S1–S5 and S3–S5 are copied from the new MC to the new BS and the new gateways, and state S5 is copied from the old MC to the old gateways. In P13, S5 is copied to the user profile server, and deleted by the old MC. These operations are still done sequentially, but some are unnecessary.

Insights. We make two new observations:

(I4) Certain control-plane operations are conservative and time consuming. When updating the route, the new MC distributes the states to the new BS and new gateways in P12. Current LTE performs state-copying sequentially to each node.

(I5) Data-plane forwarding path is ready before the entire control state operations are completed. Similar to I1, the forwarding path is updated and available after bearer update (P12). However, data service is suspended until the location profile update (P13) is done.

Guidelines. We make two more guidelines:

(G4) Sequential state copy can be made parallel. The state-copying operations in P12 are safe to parallelize without write conflicts. We thus reduce latency by parallelizing state copy to all involved nodes.

(G5) Control-plane state operations and data-plane packet forwarding can be pipelined. Given that P13 does not involve any node on the forwarding path, we can concurrently perform location update to the profile server along with data forwarding. This way, service resumption delay is reduced.

3.4 Summary

In summary, the control-plane operations are major latency contributors for all three cases. On one hand, these procedures are fully warranted, since they provision necessary states (Table 3) to enable mobile data access. On the other hand, they take sequential operations among network nodes and the device. They are ineffective in three aspects: (A1) Certain procedures are ordered and required to run in a sequence, thus incurring long latency (see G1–G3); (A2) Some procedures are not mandatory to starting/resuming data service, but they have to be completed first (see G5); (A3) Some could be run in parallel, but are mandated to run sequentially (see G4).

4 DPCM DESIGN

We present DPCM, which reduces data access latency due to control-plane operations and retains the same functionalities as 4G LTE. Following the observations in §3, DPCM departs from the MC-centric, sequential design on the control plane. Instead, we leverage the
state replicas available at the device and other nodes. We thus exploit short side-paths, parallelize certain control procedures, and pipeline the control-plane and data-plane operations without violating correctness. This results in three concrete techniques.

- **Bypassing:** To address A1, we first bypass certain existing sequence of control procedures, and substitute with equivalent, faster operations. Through these substituted operations, all required states at the device, the BS, and the gateway should be installed before data-plane forwarding. Therefore, such equivalent side-paths enable us to install states at the involved nodes earlier, thus establishing/resuming data services faster.

To realize bypassing, we seek to retrieve state replica early and install them at the nodes of interest. The key enabler is that, state replicas are already available for use. Such replicas exist at the device and other network nodes, once the device is attached to the network (see §3.1). Specifically, states S1–S6 are already stored at the device. They remain always available, even during the device’s idle mode, unless the device is explicitly detached. In reality, their values remain largely unchanged (§4.4) except for S2. Note that, S2 is updated each time P3 is executed. However, it is used for encryption over the air transfer between the device and the BS. We can delegate this key generation of S2 from the MC to the device. We run local key agreement procedure (by following P3) at the device, produce updated S2 for the device and BS, and later notify the MC of this S2 update. We will elaborate on how to use it to reduce latency in C1–C3, and how to ensure correctness in §4.4.

- **Pipelining control-data:** We further pipeline certain control-plane signaling procedures with the data-plane packet delivery. The key premise is that, data-plane forwarding can start without waiting for the entire sequence of control procedures to be completed (A2). Therefore, we pipeline data delivery with those latter-stage control procedures. This way, data access latency is reduced. To realize control-data pipelining, we exploit the technique of in-band signaling. The idea is to piggyback the control-plane states and messages with the forwarded data packets. As data packets traverse BSes and gateways, control actions are also taken at these nodes.

- **Parallelizing control procedures:** DPCM last parallelizes certain control procedures that are mandatory to retaining data service. This addresses A3, where these control procedures are executed sequentially but could be run in parallel (e.g., route update at gateways and BS in C3). We thus perform concurrent state operations by leveraging multiple replicas at different nodes.

We next show how these three techniques are applied to handle all cases C1–C3. When potential conflicts arise due to parallel and concurrent state operations (which are deemed rather rare), we further present designs to cope with them all in §4.4.

### 4.1 Service Establishment (C1)

We first use bypassing to accelerate service establishment (G1, G2). We replace the existing procedures P1–P5 with two new ones P1′ and P13′ while retaining the original control functions. Note that, P13′ can be run in parallel with the data-plane forwarding, and only P1′ needs to be completed before data delivery starts. P1′ keeps the same rounds of message exchanges in P1, but augments them by piggybacking needed control states. This is made possible by leveraging the available state replica at the device. Moreover, given the new P1′, P5 can be merged with it. P13′ synchronizes state updates at the BS, the MC and the profile server. P8 is also revised to transfer the needed states to the gateways for downlink access.

#### Uplink data

We skip the state copy action from MC to BS. In the new procedure P1′ (Figure 5a), we copy the device-side state replica to BS (following G1), by piggybacking it in the existing messages of P1 (following G2). P1′ thus installs all required states S1–S5 at the BS. To retain security of P3 (authentication and security), P1′ runs local key agreement procedure during the radio connectivity setup (§4.4). Upon completing P1′, the device has all S1–S6 and the BS has all S1–S5. Uplink data can be started immediately. Meanwhile, to notify the MC and the profile server on the device’s security context (S2) and location (S5), a new procedure P13′ (elaborated in §4.3) runs in parallel with data forwarding. P13′ does not block the data service, since (1) MC and the profile server are not responsible for data forwarding; (2) MC has delegated the security key generation of S2 to the BS, thus approving the BS’s local security context.

#### Downlink data

The downlink design (Figure 5a) is similar to that for uplink, except for P8. We still use the procedure P1′ to install states at the BS. Before downlink data forwarding starts, however, LTE still needs the gateway to have the latest state S5 (location/route information to the device). This is done by P8 in the original design. In DPCM, P8 is revised to P8′, which is initiated by BS once P1′ completes. P8′ copies the latest state S5 directly from BS, and sends it to the gateway. Upon receiving S5 in P8′, the gateway is notified about the user’s downlink data endpoint. The downlink service can start immediately thereafter. Similar to the uplink case, the procedure P13′ will update MC and the profile server in parallel with the data forwarding.
Latency reduction analysis. Our solution bypasses P2, P3, P4 and P5, which perform state copy operations from MC. Since we have used the device-side replica, the BS gets the correct states needed to start data service after P1’. Therefore, all subsequent control procedures P2, P3, P4, and P5 are saved. Given that P13’ executes in parallel with data forwarding, it does not contribute to data access latency. This applies to both uplink and downlink service establishments since the same procedures P1–P5 are involved. Moreover, such bypassing piggybacks the states within the existing device-to-BS message exchanges, which are mandatory for radio connectivity setup. P1’ suppresses the time for all non-radio signaling exchanges for uplink access, thus pushing its service establishment latency to the minimum (validated in §6.2).

Handling transient radio failures. DPCM also reduces latencies by tolerating radio failures. Upon transient radio link failures, the device re-initiates the service establishment procedure. Our solution also requires to perform recovery operations upon such failures. But our design is still faster, since it eliminates P2–P5 each time.

Handling rejections by data plane. Sometimes the data-plane nodes (gateways and BSes) may reject the connection (e.g., due to congestion). In this case, DPCM still retains the same functionality as legacy LTE, by dropping the data and stopping the forwarding. The uplink data will be dropped by the base station, while the downlink data will not be sent by the gateway. The same mechanism also applies to handover and wide-area roaming below.

4.2 Handover (C2)

We focus on the unsuccessful handover attempt under transient radio link outage (§3.2). Long service suspension is then incurred to the device. Following I3, the root cause for the latency is that, the new BS has no proper states S1–S5; it has to initiate the service establishment from scratch according to standards [14]. Note that a successful handover incurs negligible latency on data-plane forwarding (caused by inevitable radio link switching to handover).

Figure 5b shows our solution. To install states at the new BS2, we still leverage the device-side state replica, and piggyback necessary states to skip the state copy operation from MC (following G5), similar to that of P1’ for C1. Consequently, it avoids repeating P1–P5 triggered by handover failure to BS1. We thus design a new connectivity re-establishment procedure P9’ to bypass unnecessary control procedures. As a result, the new BS2 will receive the correct control states S1–S5, and reconnection reject will not happen at the first place. This design effectively eliminates rerunning P1–P5. Similar to the service establishment (C1), the new procedure P13’ will run in parallel with the data forwarding to notify the MC and the profile server of the security context (S2) and location (S5).

Latency reduction analysis. Our design avoids the latency in handling the handover reject. Therefore, the service suspension latency caused by procedures P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P5 (procedures in C1), plus the RRC connection re-establishment reject and local operations (here, cell re-scanning at the device side), is saved.

4.3 Wide-Area Roaming (C3)

For wide-area roaming, we apply bypassing (similar to P1’ in C1), pipelining (following G5), and parallelization (following G4).

Figure 5c shows how DPCM achieves them. DPCM first applies P1’ to copy device-side state replica to the new BS (§4.1). Then a new procedure P12’ is defined to replace P12. Note that, the device knows the IP address of its old gateway (stored inside its local state replica). Given this information, it is possible for the device to deliver IP packets to the old gateway via the new BS and new gateway. Based on this, P12’ constructs an IP packet, which carries the device-side state replica. The destination for this IP packet is set as the old gateway. It can implicitly update the device’s location and bearer along the route. If the device has the pending uplink data, it can send these data packets immediately after this update packet. Upon receiving this packet, the new BS copies the device-side state replica in P12’-1. It then forwards the packet to the new gateway based on the destination IP (P12’-2, equivalent to P12-2). The new gateway also copies states, and forwards the packet to the old gateway (P12’-3, equivalent to P12-3). Afterwards, the new BS has all S1–S5, the new gateway has S3–S5, and the old gateway has the updated location S5. Therefore, data forwarding can start for uplink delivery to the Internet. The old gateway can use S5 to relay its buffered downlink data to the device.

Meanwhile, we need to synchronize the state updates at the new BS, the new gateway, the old gateway, the new MC, and the profile server. This is done by the new procedure P13’. Note that there is no need to update the old MC, which only notifies the old gateway (done in P12’). In P13’, we use parallel state updates. This may lead to conflicts. To handle it, DPCM follows the current 4G design rule: the new MC determines the final state value. In P13’, the new MC has final say on states S1-S6 except S2 (delegated to the new BS).

Specifically, in P13’-1, nodes with state replica (e.g., the new BS, new gateway, etc.) can propose the states to the new MC. In P13’-2, The new MC decides whether the proposed state replica need to be updated or not, since it has the final authority on the state values. If the state is valid, the new MC broadcasts a confirmation message (Accept) to the new gateway, the new BS, the old gateway and the user profile server. If the state replica need to be updated, the new MC broadcasts an Update message with the correct states. More details of Update will be elaborated in §4.4.

Tolerating failures. Upon transient radio failures, our latency reduction will be even bigger than that for service establishment in C1. This is because DPCM prevents external radio failures from propagating to the control plane. It also tolerates internal control-plane operation failures by using multiple state replicas. In particular, the device-side replica is always available before it is detached (e.g.,powers off or airplane mode), which offers a baseline assurance.

4.4 Handling State Conflicts

Control states may be updated by either the device or the MC in LTE, thus possibly leading to inconsistent replicas at nodes. However, our user study shows that such updates, with their consequent conflicts, are rare in practice. We find that state “write” operations are infrequent in reality. We count the number of “read” (copy) and “write” (create and update) operations in our user study. The “write” operations account for only 1.3% (15,412 out of 247,842 operations).

When conflicts do arise, DPCM aims to ensure the same correctness as the current LTE. We devise domain-specific schemes to
detect and resolve them. Upon conflicts, DPCM guarantees the worst-case latency is no larger than 4G. To this end, it adopts the premise similar to LTE: the MC has the final say on the state updates. In leveraging the state replicas, DPCM disallows other nodes to locally modify the state value, thus mitigating the potential inconsistencies. Therefore, in DPCM, the MC has final say on S1–S6 except S2. For S2, MC delegates it to the device and BS. This is reasonable, since S2 is responsible for the encryption key for the air transfer between the device and the BS. The device and the BS can decide on it.

**Concurrent updates by device.** Bypassing works under the premise that state replicas are identical. When the malicious or selfish device modifies the control states (e.g., increasing the QoS level), potential conflicts may arise between the device and other nodes. However, this can be detected and resolved in DPCM.

In DPCM, each state (S1, S3–S6) is originally distributed by the MC similar to the current LTE. Moreover, the state replica is signed with a fingerprint, which includes a hash of the states and a signature by MC. At runtime, both the states and the fingerprint are carried in the messages. The network nodes can thus verify whether the session states are issued by MC (with the correct signature), and whether they are modified since their distribution (with the hash).

When the cheating or compromised device modifies states, such state changes can be detected by network nodes via mismatched fingerprint for the new state replica. Then network nodes roll back to the LTE legacy design by asking a copy directly from MC. While simple, such rollback is correct in LTE due to the following fact: Without the connectivity states, no control procedures can run.

**Concurrent updates by MC.** Another conflict may arise when the MC updates certain state values. For example, when a prepaid user runs out of his data credits, the MC may update his radio access control list (S1) to forbid further access. When the MC wants to modify certain control states, it can use Update (in C1–C3) or 4G’s modification procedures [8] (after C1–C3) to notify the involved device, the BS and the gateway.

However, transient period exists where the nodes use the outdated state values to forward data, when the MC are updating these nodes. DPCM prevents it by using domain-specific conflict resolution dependent on specific states S1–S6. Specifically the user location (S5) does not pose problems, since all nodes are always notified with the latest device location by the device and BS (§4.3). For IP address (S6), no issues arise in common scenarios because it remains the same after attach (in both LTE and DPCM). Note that the dynamic change of gateway/IP assignment can still be supported by DPCM. To do so, the mobility controller (MC) first determines the potential change of gateway/IP, and then rollbacks DPCM to 4G LTE to run the legacy procedures. This ensures that, DPCM retains the same complexity and scalability as 4G LTE.

* S1: Radio access control list (RACL). RACL over LTE turns out to be group based, following the 3GPP standards [8, 13]. That is, a group of users may have the same access rights (e.g., “international roaming users”) and may share the group access signature. Therefore, a device that was originally in an access group but later revoked by the MC, may still pass the authorization using the old signature. It thus gains radio access. To prevent this, DPCM requires the MC to initiate the delete operation only after successful C1–C3.

The revoked device consequently cannot gain radio access. The incurred latency is no worse than the current LTE.

* S2: Security context. DPCM delegates the security key generation of S2 from MC to BS. For the first-time registration (attach), DPCM still requires the legacy 4G mechanism (no accelerations). Afterwards, it runs the key negotiation between the device and the BS during the connectivity setup (P1’). In this process, DPCM retains the same security level as 4G LTE (elaborated in Appendix).

To this end, DPCM adopts the Diffie-Hellman protocol [40] for local security key negotiation, and binds it to the unclonable group identification [29] in group-based radio access authorization. For each radio access group, the profile server generates a key pair \( (K_{pub}^{UE}, K_{pri}^{UE}) \). The public key \( K_{pub}^{UE} \) has been pre-distributed to all BSes, while the private key \( K_{pri}^{UE} \) is only pre-stored in the user profile server. For each service establishment or handover or location update, the device calculates the one-time signature \( Cert_{UE} \) based on \( K_{pri}^{UE} \) and the current device-side timestamp \( T_{UE} \). Upon receiving them, the BS uses \( K_{pub}^{UE} \) to verify whether the signature \( Cert_{UE} \) is derived from \( K_{pri}^{UE} \), and performs similar derivation of signature \( Cert_{BS} \) for mutual authentication. Then it runs the Diffie-Hellman protocol to compute the key. It is resilient to man-in-the-middle attacks since the mutual authentication has been completed.

* S3: Billing policy. DPCM retains correct data billing by decoupling packet counting (accounting) from charging rule updates (pricing). At runtime, the gateway correctly counts packets without charging rules. The bill remains correct, as long as the gateway uses the same packet counter for billing with the charging rule retrieved later.

* S4: QoS. DPCM retains correct QoS by regulating its update before the successful connectivity establishment. Downgraded QoS is only allowed after successful C1–C3. Data forwarding is still no worse than LTE, which mandates the same rule during this period.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

We have implemented DPCM as an extension of OpenAirInterface [45], a software-defined 4G control/data-plane protocol stack. Figure 6 shows its two parts: DPCM-enabled network nodes and DPCM-enabled devices. Our implementation seeks to support incremental deployment on existing 4G network infrastructure, and backward compatibility with commodity phones.

**Network Nodes.** Each network node realizes DPCM with a modular virtualization layer under the control-plane protocol stacks, without changes on existing 4G protocols. It supports incremental deployability and backward compatibility: It retains the illusion of sequential control to upper 4G protocol stacks, but re-intercepting 4G signaling and data messages to achieve DPCM’s functionalities (summarized in Table 4). It also supports legacy 4G devices, by relaying their messages to the upper 4G protocols. Such virtualization-based implementation reduces control-plane complexity, facilitates network management via modularity, and ensures correctness for other LTE functions by retaining the illusion of sequential control.

1) Bypassing. DPCM piggybacks necessary state replicas to achieve the bypassing. To leverage the device-side state replica, we use the criticalExtensionsFuture container in 4G RRC connectivity setup messages [14] to piggyback the necessary states.
### Table 4: DPCM virtualizes 4G control procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTE-stack messages</th>
<th>DPCM-layer action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Radio conn. setup</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack. Run bypassing with its piggybacked info.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Service request</td>
<td>Locally acknowledge LTE stack with the state from the bypassing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Auth. and security</td>
<td>Immediately acknowledge LTE stack with local key agreement and radio access control group identification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Initial context setup</td>
<td>Locally acknowledge LTE’s requests. Bypassing has achieved the same function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5: Data bearer setup</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6: Data notification</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7: Paging messages</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8: Modify bearer</td>
<td>Locally acknowledge LTE stack. In-band pipelining has achieved the same function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9: Radio connectivity reestablishment</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack. Run bypassing with its piggybacked info.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P10: Location update</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P11: Primary state transfer</td>
<td>Locally acknowledge LTE stack. Bypassing and parallelization have achieved the same function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P12:Bearer update</td>
<td>Locally acknowledge LTE stack. In-band pipelining has achieved the same function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P13: User profile update</td>
<td>Relay to LTE stack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This layer is only visible to the DPCM layer, and are removed when the message is delivered to the upper 4G protocols.

(2) Pipelining Control-Data. We implement DPCM’s in-band pipelining by overloading the standardized cellular data tunnel (GTP-U [13]). The signaling messages are piggybacked as payloads (together with normal data) of the GTP-U packets. On receipt of them, the DPCM layer will extract the signaling messages, push them to acceleration components, and hold the normal data until mandatory control procedures are completed.

(3) Control-control parallelization. The DPCM layer implements concurrent operations to parallelize sequential control procedures. The state replica proposed from the device to network nodes is carried within the data-plane (via GTP-U tunnels [13]). The state replica proposed by network nodes is piggybacked inside the standardized messages from control interfaces (S1-AP [15] between the BS and MC, and GTP-C [7] between the MC and gateways). Once the the network nodes install the correct states and resolve the state conflicts, DPCM locally acknowledges 4G protocols’ pending procedures without waiting for legacy state migrations.

(4) Handling conflicts. It is realized as follows.

- Data Billing (S3). DPCM retains the correct data billing by decoupling packet counting from charging rule. The granularity of counting packets depends on whether per-flow or per-device billing is applied (based on pre-purchased data plan). The base station learns it by checking the device’s charging group (using group identification). For per-flow billing, the gateway temporarily records the flow ID for every packet.
- QoS (S4). With unclonable group identification above, the gateway learns the device’s QoS class, which offers further information on packet delay/loss/priority. For the non-class QoS metrics, only the minimum QoS (e.g., best-effort service) is offered before session state is migrated. This forwarding under QoS is still no worse than 4G: Under the same condition, 4G will not enable any data access to the device at the same time.

### Device-side support.
To benefit from DPCM, the devices should be upgraded to support it. DPCM can be incrementally deployed as a software daemon, without changing the hardware modem. It pre-stores device-side session states in the reserved fields of the SIM card (standardized in [9]). Note that only the critical states S1–S6 should be stored on the client side. To retain the same security level as 4G LTE, these states are associated with the fingerprints (§4.4) stored in the SIM card. It extends the existing device-side state replica for bypassing control procedures using radio connectivity setup (P1). This is realized with the ENVELOPE commands [10] from OS to SIM card (e.g., via Android Telephony [2]). Then it generates DPCM-aware in-band messages (§4.1–§4.3). It uses Android’s VPN interface oip [31] to redirect packets to a separate tunnel at OS level, re-encapsulates it with piggybacked device-side states, and then forward them to the LTE air interface.

### 6 EVALUATION

We assess DPCM’s overall latency reduction (§6.1), effectiveness of its components (§6.2), benefits on apps (§6.3) and its overhead (§6.4).

**Experiment setup.** To approximate the operational networks, we deploy DPCM in a testbed, configure it with the parameters observed from real-world operational networks and run evaluation experiments.

The testbed consists of three servers (Dell PowerEdge T320, 2.7 GHz 6-core Intel Xeon E5-2420V2 CPU, 8 GB RAM and three 1 Gbps Ethernet ports) with the network topology shown in Figure 4c. One server runs the user profile database, while others emulate two location domains by running multiple machines each serving as the software-defined BS, gateway and MC separately. Each virtual machine installs Ubuntu 14.04, OpenAirInterface [45] and DPCM. We use oaisim from OpenAirInterface to emulate the mobile device and the radio link. We configure the testbed with parameters and round-trips observed from the user study logs over operational networks (§2). In each log, we retrieve signaling messages and quantify the elapsed time between successive messages in each control procedure. We then configure the radio latency in oaisim as the round-trip time of 4G radio connectivity setup procedure, and the round-trip delay for each procedure in OpenAirInterface as the breakdown results (using tc command). To assess the failure handling, we inject the state migration failures between the MC and gateways/BS/profile server, and transient radio link failures. Our approximation of radio transmission time might be
slightly optimistic without taking into account of the time needed for transferring extra bytes piggybacked (312 byte in §6.4).

6.1 Overall Performance

We examine how much control-plane latency DPCM could reduce compared with 4G LTE. In each round, we configure the test bed with the parameters and round-trips observed from the operational 4G, and compare DPCM with 4G under two metrics: $\Delta = 4G - DPCM$ and $\eta = 4G/DPCM$. Figure 7 and Table 5 show the results in all the normal/failure scenarios in §2–3. We have three observations.

First, DPCM reduces control-plane latency in all the scenarios except C2. On average, it reduces latency to 80.0ms (4G: 168.7ms), 98.2ms (4G: 846.9ms), 89.3ms (4G: 670.1ms), 166.2ms (4G: 901.6ms), and 359.1ms (4G: 3004.3ms) in C1, C1F, C2, C3 and C3F, respectively. Note that for legacy LTE, all scenarios’ results conform to our studies in §2. For each run, we define $\Delta$ as DPCM’s latency reduction over 4G, and $\eta$ as the ratio of 4G’s latency over DPCM. Table 5 shows that, the minimal reduction is 29.4ms, 483.2ms, 153.7ms, 132.0ms and 99.7ms in C1, C1F, C2F, C3 and C3F, respectively. The key negotiation’s computation latency of 3.7ms. The key negotiation’s computation overhead is much smaller than group identification, 2.3% in C3. For key agreements, using keys less than 512-bit incurs 7.0% of C1’s component. For authorization, and the cryptographic key agreement (P1 → P1’ in §4–5). For the processing latency, Figure 9 plots the result under different key sizes (each has 500 runs). For the key size less than 512-bit, both procedures incur marginal latency. For the group identification, the maximum observed verification time is 3.9ms with the 512-bit key, accounting for 4.8% extra latencies in C1 and 2.3% in C3. For key agreements, using keys less than 512-bit incurs 5.1% latency reduction.

Second, DPCM saves more latency in mobility scenario. On average, DPCM saves 646.7ms more latency in C3 than C1 (no failures). The reason is that, the mobile scenario involves more control procedures (Figure 4) and thus more opportunities for latency reduction.

Third, DPCM further reduces latencies by handling failures. Latency reductions (A) are more significant in the failure cases (C1F, C2F and C3F). This is because DPCM helps to carry needed states in in-band signaling messages and thus largely avoid further failures. In fact, DPCM is resilient to transient failures and it induces low latency in all the cases, regardless of failures or not.

6.2 Micro Benchmark

We next assess the latency reduction in each DPCM’s component. For each round of the above test, we quantify DPCM’s latency reductions over 4G from its components. Figure 8 and Table 6 show the results.

Efficiency in control latency reduction. We show that DPCM is efficient in reducing the control-plane latency. Note that the total latency can be divided into radio and non-radio latency. Radio latency is inevitable since message passing between the device and the network (the BS) is mandatory for any control function. In fact, DPCM aims to cut off non-radio latency caused by sequential execution of control procedures. Figure 8 shows that, DPCM latency is close to the radio link latency. This implies that DPCM has approximated the lower bound of the control latency reduction without radio-link latency reduction. Our solution can gain bigger reduction in 5G due to the radio link latency reduction (e.g., up to 1ms [35, 43]). Then the saving gain from DPCM will be relatively larger.

Bypassing. The bypassing helps reduce latencies for all scenarios except C2. For service establishment (C1/C1F) and handover with failures (C2F), the bypassing contributes all of the latency reduction (shown in Figure 7). It reduces 88.7ms on average, and 928.3ms at maximum in C1. Upon failures, it reduces more, i.e. 748.7ms and 580.8ms on average in C1F and C2F. This is because bypassing carries the states needed and thus the request will not be rejected in DPCM when the device attempts to re-establish connectivity after transient radio outage. For wide-area roaming (C3), it reduces 51.5ms on average and 473.8ms at maximum. It contributes to 7.0% of DPCM’s total reduction on average.

We next evaluate its overhead. The bypassing may incur the processing delay for the group identification for radio access control for authorization, and the cryptographic key agreement (P1 → P1’ in §4–5). For the processing latency, Figure 9 plots the result under different key sizes (each has 500 runs). For the key size less than 512-bit, both procedures incur marginal latency. For the group identification, the maximum observed verification time is 3.9ms with the 512-bit key, accounting for 4.8% extra latencies in C1 and 2.3% in C3. For key agreements, using keys less than 512-bit incurs the maximum computation latency of 3.7ms. The key negotiation’s computation overhead is much smaller than group identification, since it uses symmetric keys instead of the public/private key pair.
We next quantify how DPCM’s total latency reduction on average. They contribute 93.0% of DPCM’s latency reduction in wide-area roaming. In failure-free case (C3), they reduce 2.2× latency and contribute 95.1% reduction on average. The reason is that, the wide-area roaming involves more control procedures among more network nodes. This offers more room for DPCM to reduce the latency.

### 6.3 Benefits on Applications

We next quantify how DPCM helps reduce app-level delay. In this experiment, we run the Web page (via wget) and YouTube video (via youtube-dl [5]) request in two settings: static case to test the service establishment, and mobility case to test wide-area roaming. These applications first issue requests via cellular protocols in our test bed (by redirecting them to OpenAirInterface’s built-in virtual interface oip1). They further trigger the responses of webpage and video streaming, with which we measure their loading times. We repeat this experiment with/without failures for 100 times.

Figure 10 shows the results in mobility cases with/without failures. Both apps experience longer delay than the data service suspension (Table 5). They are not resumed immediately due to the imperfect adaptation to the varying network. Without failures, DPCM reduces the average web loading from 1.5s to 0.7s (2.1×), and the average video loading from 9.8s to 5.7s (1.7×). With failures, DPCM achieves 3.7× reduction for web (from 2.5s to 0.7s) and 2.1× reduction for video (from 12.3s to 5.7s). In static settings without failures (C1), DPCM reduces the web loading from 417.0ms to 290.8ms (1.4×), and reduces video loading from 4.2s to 3.5s (1.2×) on average. With failures (C1F), DPCM achieves 2.2× reduction for web (from 637.9ms to 290.8ms) and 1.5× reduction for video (from 5.4s to 3.5s).

### 6.4 System Overhead

**Signaling overhead.** DPCM retains comparable signaling overhead to 4G. First, DPCM uses piggyback to avoid introducing more messages, but it needs extra bytes inside the signaling messages to piggyback the states. Our prototype pigbacks 312 more bytes for messages between device and network (including states and signatures), and 56 more bytes for other signaling messages inside the network (states only). Note that these signaling messages are physically delivered over the shared channel of data and signaling (PUSCH for uplink, PDSCH for downlink [20]). It may incur marginal transmission delay (e.g., 312B/1Mbps=2.5ms). Second, in the location update (C3), DPCM needs extra messages for parallelization and conflicts handling. For each location update, it exchanges 12 messages in the worst case with conflicts, which is less than 4G (≥14 messages) since it bypasses multiple control procedures.

**CPU and memory.** DPCM demands marginal CPU and negligible memory. In all our experiments, the maximum CPU utilization is 1.3% on each network node, and 0.1% on the device (oaisim in our current prototype). The maximum memory consumption observed is 53.9MB on network nodes, and 3.5MB on the device.

**Energy consumption.** Our prototype emulates device with oaisim, so currently we cannot directly measure DPCM’s power consumption on the device. We gauge that it is negligible, because DPCM reuses 4G’s existing communication mechanisms, and only needs marginal processing (key agreement and the signature).

### 7 DISCUSSION

**Hints for future 5G (and beyond).** While designed for 4G LTE, DPCM is applicable to the future mobile network (e.g., 5G and beyond). Note that, the fundamental problem of sequential procedure execution is not unique to LTE. It will probably carry over to the 5G, since various ongoing 5G standardization proposals (listed in [18]) are reusing the current control-plane designs with modifications. With extensive efforts in reducing the 5G radio latency (targeting at ≤1 ms [34, 35, 43]), the control-plane operations will be likely the next major latency bottleneck. Our work offers an early alarm, and contributes new solutions for 5G and beyond. Assuming the 5G radio latency as 1 ms, our estimation (by running the experiments in §6) shows that on average, DPCM achieves 13.4× overall latency reduction in service establishment (C1), and 88.9× reduction in wide-area roaming (C3) over existing the control-plane design.

**More problem/solution spaces for the future design.** DPCM is our first effort to seek the alternative control-plane in the mobile network. We believe that, more improvements are possible by further exploring the problem and solution spaces. At the problem level, the data access latency may be further reduced, by generalizing DPCM from the control plane to the management plane and physical layers. In these contexts, we believe that the general idea of DPCM and its virtualization-based implementation can be generalized. At the solution level, other approaches are possible, such as a clean-slate redesign of control-plane protocols with built-in bypassing/parallelization/pipelining features.

**Benefits on other applications.** Besides the apps in §6.3, DPCM can also benefits others with varying latency reductions. For apps with continuous stream data (e.g., video streaming, virtual/augmented reality), DPCM reduces the first packet’s latency. For bursty traffic (e.g., Web and instant messaging), DPCM benefits more because of their on-off traffic patterns and thus frequent connectivity establishment/migration.
8 RELATED WORK

In recent years, extensive efforts have been made to improve the performance of 4G LTE networks. They include improving the wireless access [25, 53, 57] and management [33, 60], cross-layer optimization of transport protocols [44, 61, 65] and apps [24, 26, 62, 63] to name a few. We study a different topic of how control-plane operations affect data access latency. At the control plane, several optimizations for specific control procedures (notably fast handoffs) are proposed, including the pre-tunneling [41, 64], mitigating the authentication time [22, 32, 55], modifying the signaling messages [28, 66], parameter tunings[21, 49, 50], etc. DPCM differs from them, since it studies a broader set of control procedures, and parallelizes them for low data access latency. Several recent efforts seek to simplify the cellular infrastructure using software-defined [36, 42, 58] and virtualization [27, 46, 47] approaches. Our work differs from them in two dimensions. First, we focus on a unique issue of latency deficiency (i.e. the sequential control). Second, DPCM leverages the client-side state replica to latency reduction, which has not been explored by prior efforts.

There have been several recent studies on the Internet control plane [30, 37, 39, 51, 56], in the context of software-defined networking. They examine how to perform consistent state update [39, 51], state migration in middle-boxes [30, 37, 54], and conflict resolution over shared states [56], etc. Instead, we study how to accelerate 4G control-plane operations, which are much more complex than their Internet counterpart.

9 CONCLUSION

It has become increasingly important to offer always-on, low-latency network service to the mobile users. In this work, we show that current LTE control-plane operations create a major bottleneck for reducing latency for mobile data access. On one hand, they are well justified since they provision necessary states at the device and network nodes to start or retain data service. On the other hand, their design does not account for efficient operations in the 4G/5G era. In fact, they are required to run sequentially and have to be all completed before starting/resuming data-plane packet delivery. In this work, we analyze their latency root causes and apply parallel computing techniques to speed it up.

Our work can be understood in a broader context. Like other distributed systems, LTE network should balance the latency and consistency in its control-plane operations. This problem is largely unaddressed, and leads to large delay at the user side. While the community has made extensive efforts on improving data-plane wireless access, issues on the control-plane have been overlooked to certain extent. On the solution side, our initial attempt to accelerate the control functions yields promising results. Our study may stimulate more community interests on applying the rich insights from distributed system context to revamp the 4G/5G design.

APPENDIX: SECURITY ANALYSIS

We show how DPCM retains the same security level as 4G LTE. This nails down to three goals: (1) for threats that can be defended by 4G (specified in standards [16, 17]), DPCM should also defend it; (2) for threats that cannot be defended by 4G (e.g., DoS), DPCM should not further ease or amplify them; (3) new threats should not be made possible by DPCM itself. We next analyze how DPCM satisfies them by exploring the possible attacks.

Authentication/authorization/accounting. DPCM offers mutual authentication and authorization with Diffie-Hellman protocol bound with group identification (§4.4), and correct accounting by decoupling packet counting from policy updates.

Over-the-air confidentiality and integrity. DPCM encrypts user’s data and signaling over the air. It replaces 4G’s key agreements with a variant of Diffie-Hellman protocol (§4.4).

Defenses to man-in-the-middle attacks. Two threats exist. The first is the IMSI catcher, which fakes the base station and sniffs the device behaviors. DPCM defends this with mutual authentication, and encrypts user data and signaling over the air. The second is the Diffie-Hellman protocol for key agreement, whose original version can be exploited to fake the negotiated keys in the middle. DPCM defends it by binding the key agreement after the group-based authentication, thus detecting the faked device or network nodes.

Denial-of-service attacks. 4G LTE is vulnerable to DoS attacks by design. Previous works [23, 48, 59] have shown that, the malicious devices can exploit the radio resource scheduling and signaling messages, and launch radio jamming and DDoS attacks to base stations and mobility controllers. The 4G standards [16, 17] choose not to fully address DoS because of the high cost. Similar attacks can also appear in DPCM, which however does not ease or amplify them. With Piggiby mechanisms, DPCM does not incur more signalling messages between device and network than 4G LTE.

Local device attacks. This is a new potential threat in DPCM. Since DPCM leverages device-side information, a selfish device may modify its local states and affect the control procedures for its own benefit (e.g. increase its QoS level). To defend it, DPCM lets network nodes detect the device’s state modification (which is disallowed in DPCM). Once the modification is detected, DPCM rolls back to 4G’s network-only control procedures, which guarantees the same 4G security level. Note that, the device-side states are initialized and distributed by the MC during the session state/migration. In DPCM, the state is distributed together with a fingerprint issued by the network nodes for integrity verification. The fingerprint includes a hash of the session states, and a signature issued by the mobility controller (with the signature), and whether the state is distributed together with a fingerprint issued by the mobility controller (with the signature), and whether the states are modified since distribution (with the hash).

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